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Bargaining Over Labor: Do Patients Have Any Power?
* 
 
We provide a new method of identifying the level of relative bargaining power in bilateral 
negotiations using exogenous variation in the degree of conflict between parties. Using daily 
births data, we study negotiations over birth timing. In doing so, we exploit the fact that fewer 
children are born on the “inauspicious” dates of February 29 and April 1; most likely, we 
argue, reflecting parental preferences. When these inauspicious dates abut a weekend, this 
creates a potential conflict between avoiding the inauspicious date (the parents’ likely 
preference), and avoiding the weekend (the doctor’s likely preference). Using daily births 
data, we estimate how often this conflict is resolved in favor of the physician. We show how 
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1.  Introduction 
Bargaining theory  –  most notably Nash bargaining  –  has seen a resurgent 
application in policy work. In labor, family, and health economics, applied analyses use 
the Nash bargaining solution as the basis for evaluating policy outcomes. Invariably, 
however,  researchers  are forced to make assumptions regarding the distribution of 
bargaining power between agents so as to derive quantitative predictions of the 
consequences of various policy interventions.
1
Of course, researchers have utilized approaches that are either laboratory-based or 
more indirect calibrations. For example, by studying protocols such as the ultimatum 
game, economists have gained insights regarding whether agents engage in strategies 
consistent with subgame perfection or find it more difficult to separate themselves from a 
wider social context.
 However to date, there are few, if any, 
direct approaches that can empirically validate whether a particular assumption about 
relative bargaining power is reasonable or not. 
2
In other approaches, the data required to make inferences about bargaining power 
parameters is more onerous. Sieg (2000) examines medical malpractice disputes using a 
detailed dataset on settlement outcome and is able to parameterize a particular extensive-
 As Samuelson (2005) argues, an issue which arises in the study of 
bargaining under carefully designed protocols is whether experiments are truly testing the 
theory or some more basic assumptions regarding behavior. 
                                                 
1 For example, see Pezzin and Steinberg Schone (1999) on informal caregiving, Maude-Griffin, Feldman 
and Wholey (2004) on bargaining with HMOs, and Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) on marriage and divorce 
laws. 
2 The classic study was by Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) and has been replicated and enriched 
by many others. See Samuelson (2005) for a review.   3 
form game. Yashiv (2003) examines labor market outcomes and infers key bargaining 
power parameters from detailed aggregate data. Flinn (2006) uses detailed data about 
firm profit information and other labor market variables to calibrate bargaining power in 
a matching model. However, each of these approaches requires access to detailed 
information on both the outcome and the distribution of surplus from negotiations. 
The purpose of this paper is to propose a method by which information on the 
distribution of bargaining power can be extracted from data based solely on the outcomes 
of bilateral negotiations. The identification method uses a source of exogenous variation 
in  the degree of conflict  between two parties in a negotiation. Combining this with 
bargaining outcomes, we can identify the share of the surplus each party will receive on 
average. The idea is that - in some situations - both, one or the other, or neither party will 
be indifferent as to a particular outcome. That variation will allow us to determine 
whether other sources of variation as distinct from variation in preferences are driving 
observed agreements. Importantly, in utilizing this, we rely on Nash bargaining theory in 
its axiomatic form rather than any well-defined protocol of offer and acceptance.
3
The context we apply this method to is doctor-patient negotiations with regard to 
birth timing decisions. This is an application of independent policy interest in health 
economics.  It is generally thought that physicians have power to determine patient 
 
Consequently, we generate an estimate of bargaining power free of issues associated with 
the structure of negotiating environments, as this is something we do not observe. 
                                                 
3 The axiomatic nature of Nash bargaining means that the underlying theory motivating our empirical 
identification strategy is independent of strong behavioural assumptions common in some applications of 
bargaining theory using non-cooperative game theory. Specifically, it requires that agents have a utility 
function and that they act to find Pareto improving deals. However, the only key assumptions –  as 
discussed below – are that doctors have a modest preference for weekday deliveries while patients are 
indifferent as to the day of the week but have modest preferences for avoid certain days of the year.   4 
treatment (in all its facets) for medical reasons and that these take precedence over non-
medical motivations for treatment. This issue has emerged in relation to elective cesarean 
procedures and choices of these over vaginal birth with official pronouncements 
discouraging this choice for non-medical or convenience purposes.
4 However, there is 
also evidence that the timing of births themselves may be somewhat motivated by non-
medical factors (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra, 1999; Lo, 2003; Gans and Leigh, 2009). 
This has called into question the degree of physician power in driving treatment 
decisions.
5
In this paper, we propose a test of the relative bargaining power of physicians and 
patients over birth timing. Our approach is as follows. First, we begin with the well-
 
From a bargaining perspective, the difficulty with previous studies of birth timing 
is that they identify reasons why patients might impact on scheduling, but at the same 
time do not offer any reason why physicians might object to these changes in birth 
timing. The shifting that occurred was based on individual tax incentives (Dickert-Conlin 
and Chandra, 1999; Gans and Leigh, 2009; Tamm, 2009; Neugart and Ohlsson, 2009) or 
cultural factors (Lo, 2003) which are both considerations that are likely to have been 
regarded as irrelevant by physicians. Absent any conflict, it should not be surprising that 
patient preferences might be taken into account. As such, these studies do not provide 
conclusive evidence of patient power (relative to their physicians) as they do not 
necessarily identify situations in which patient and doctor preferences come into conflict. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, ACOG, 1999 and NIH, 2006. 
5 To be clear, we have in mind situations in which patients’ preferences conflict with those of doctors. We 
distinguish these from circumstances  where the patient has a preference, and the doctor is largely 
indifferent. In most discussions between doctors and patients, the costs and benefits of the decision are 
borne almost entirely by the patient. What makes weekend births somewhat unusual (compared with other 
medical decisions) is that the patient is impinging upon the doctor’s leisure time, without the doctor 
receiving any additional remuneration for working on the weekend.   5 
studied notion of a ‘weekend effect’ in birth timing; that is, as elective birth procedures 
(elective cesareans and induction procedures) have become more widespread, fewer such 
births are scheduled for weekends than for weekdays. This is consistent with physicians’ 
preferring to enjoy their leisure time on weekends, to take advantage of complementarity 
in leisure consumption with their friends and family.  
Second, we identify days of the year whereby patient preferences might be strong 
for non-medical reasons. We identify April 1  and February 29  as generating 
systematically fewer births. There appears to be no medical reason for this, and hence 
think it is likely that this represents a pure patient preference to avoid inauspicious dates.  
Finally, we identify situations where patient preferences for avoiding inauspicious 
dates and physician preferences for avoiding weekends coincide. When these 
inauspicious dates occur on a Monday or Friday (abutting a weekend), patients may have 
a stronger preference for a weekend birth. Heterogeneity in these dates across years 
allows us to estimate the effect of increased conflict on the birth timing outcome; in 
particular, whether physician or patient preferences ‘win out.’ This provides us with an 
estimate of the relative power of physicians over patients in bargaining over labor. 
Using daily births data, we apply our test. We find that when there is a conflict, it 
is resolved in favor of the inauspicious weekday about three-quarters of the time. This 
suggests that while physicians have greater relative power, it is not absolute and patient 
preferences can drive birth timing decisions for non-medical reasons. But significantly, 
we demonstrate how this can be interpreted as an estimate of the average Nash bargaining 
power parameter for such negotiations in the population.   6 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
available medical evidence on how technology can affect birth timing, and the economic 
literature on the factors that affect the timing of births. In Section 3, we show the trends 
in weekend births and identify inauspicious days. In Section 4, we present estimates of 
the relative bargaining power of doctors and patients. The final section concludes. 
2.   Medical and Economic Evidence on Birth Timing 
The Science of Birth Timing 
From a medical standpoint, there are three main ways in which the timing of birth 
can be affected. First, induction of labor can be performed, with the aim of achieving 
delivery before the time that it would naturally have occurred. This involves stimulating 
the uterus (eg. with cervically-applied prostaglandin,  or  an  injection of synthetic 
oxytocin).  Induction is typically performed in cases where the fetus is judged to be 
becoming too large, or the pregnancy is post-term (ie. 43 weeks or longer). Gans and 
Leigh (2008) estimate that the induction rate in Australia has risen from 20 percent in 
1981 to 25 percent in 2005. 
The second means of affecting birth timing is by performing a cesarean section. 
Cesarean sections are classified as elective (due to anticipated risks or maternal request), 
or emergency (due to birth complications).  Gans and Leigh (2008) estimate that the 
cesarean section rate has risen from 12 percent in 1981 to 30 percent in 2005.
6
                                                 
6 Note that induction and cesarean section are not mutually exclusive. Gans and Leigh (2008) note that in 5 
percent of cases, induction of labor was performed unsuccessfully, and the baby was ultimately delivered 
by cesarean section. 
 Of those   7 
cesarean section procedures carried out in 2005, 59 percent were elective and 41 percent 
were emergency (Laws et al. 2007). 
The third means of affecting birth timing is by administering drugs that delay 
birth (eg. tocolytic agents). This is typically done in cases where the fetus is pre-term (a 
pregnancy of 37 weeks or less). Such drugs typically only delay birth by a day or two, but 
this can provide time to transfer the mother to a more advanced hospital, or assemble an 
appropriately skilled medical team. Delaying birth in this manner is generally thought to 
be rare, though we have been unable to find statistics on its prevalence.  
We expect that the use of medications that delay birth is unlikely to have more 
than a trivial impact on the overall distribution of births in Australia. However, this does 
not mean that births can only be brought forward. Doctors and patients frequently have 
discretion on when to schedule an induction or cesarean section, and it is perfectly 
possible that non-medical factors can bring these dates forward or backwards. 
Evidence on Physicians’ and Parents’ Preferences 
In our analysis, we make two key assumptions: that physicians prefer not to work 
on weekends (but parents are indifferent about a weekend or weekday birth), and that 
parents prefer not to have a child born on an inauspicious date (but physicians are 
indifferent about auspicious and inauspicious dates). We now turn to the evidence 
supporting these assumptions. 
Several studies provide evidence about physicians’ preference to deliver babies on 
regular working days. To begin, there is the simple empirical fact that in countries where 
weekends are traditional holidays, the number of births occurring on Saturdays and 
Sundays is significantly lower than on other days of the week. This pattern has been   8 
clearly demonstrated for several countries, including the US (Chandra et al.,  2004), 
Germany (Neugart and Ohlsson, 2009) and Australia (Gans and Leigh, 2008). Studying 
Israel, where Saturday is a holiday but Sunday is a working day, Cohen (1983) found 
fewer births on Saturdays, but more births on Sundays. It has also been noted that major 
public holidays tend to coincide with a significant drop in the birth rate (see eg. Cohen, 
1983; Chandra et al., 2004; Gans and Leigh, 2008). In addition, it has been shown that 
the number of births declines during annual obstetricians’ conferences in Australia and 
the United States (Gans, Leigh and Varganova, 2007). 
Additional evidence on physicians’ preferences also comes from studies that have 
looked at the number of births at different times of the day. Brown (1996) shows that the 
rate of unplanned cesarean section births rises sharply from 3pm to 9pm on Fridays, and 
attributes the ‘Friday rush hour’ effect to physicians’ demand for leisure. Similarly, Spetz 
et al. (2001) find an increase in the probability of cesarean section procedures during the 
evening hours, when the leisure incentive is more likely to impact on obstetricians’ 
decision-making.
7
What evidence do we have about parents’ aversion to inauspicious dates? Using a 
single year (1998) of birth data from Taiwan, Lo (2003)  demonstrates that Chinese 
preferences over certain dates significantly impacted upon birth timing, with cesarean 
section births being particularly affected. Focusing on the discontinuous incentive created 
by the US child tax credit, Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) demonstrate the shifting 
of births from the first week of January to the last week of December. Analyzing the 
introduction of the Australian ‘Baby Bonus’, Gans and Leigh (2009) find that it led births 
  
                                                 
7 It is also plausible that doctors avoid weekend births for altruistic reasons: because they believe that 
weekend births are causally more dangerous. This would not affect doctors’ incentives, but it would change 
the interpretation of our results.   9 
to be delayed in order that parents could receive the bonus. Looking at a similar birth 
payment in Germany (the Elterngeld), Tamm (2009) and Neugart and Ohlsson (2009) 
find that a significant number of births were postponed so that parents were eligible for 
the payment. Since these tax credits and government payments did not affect physicians’ 
remuneration, each of these studies assume that the change in birth timing was due to 
parents’ preferences. 
Possible Biases 
In this sub-section,  we have presented evidence that physicians prefer not to 
deliver babies on weekends and parents prefer not to have their children born on 
inauspicious dates. However, if our aim is to estimate a bargaining parameter, it must 
also be the case that parents are indifferent about weekday and weekend births, and 
doctors are indifferent between normal and inauspicious dates. As with all null proofs, 
this is a difficult standard to meet.  
In the case of parents, our impression is that few have strong preferences between 
weekdays and weekends. Although there is evidence that infant mortality rates are higher 
on weekends, it is unclear whether this is due to selection or because weekends are 
causally more dangerous.
8
In the case of physicians, our impression is that superstitious beliefs are rare.
 Regardless, our anecdotal impression is that parents do not 
perceive weekend births to be more dangerous. 
9
                                                 
8 See for example MacFarlane (1978); Mangold (1981); Hendry (1981); Mathers (1983); Dowding et. al. 
(1987); Gould et. al. (2003); Luo et. al. (2004); Hamilton and Restrepo (2006); Hong et. al. (2007). 
9 We have been unable to identify any datasets that would allow us to look at the prevalence of birth 
complications on inauspicious dates. 
 
Commonsense suggests that an obstetrician who refused to deliver babies on inauspicious 
dates  would be regarded as an oddity by peers and hospital managers alike. Health   10 
researchers who have looked at the influence of superstitions on patient care  almost 
invariably adopt the standpoint that obstetricians do not believe in lucky and unlucky 
days (see eg. O’Reilly and Stevenson, 2000).
10
3.   Weekend Births and Inauspicious Days 
  
However, it is also useful to note the direction of the bias in the case that the 
foregoing assumptions are incorrect. If parents are averse to weekend births, this will bias 
downwards our estimate of parents’  bargaining power. If doctors are averse to 
inauspicious dates, this will bias upwards our estimate of parents’ bargaining power. 
To analyze births patterns, we use daily birth count data  from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, covering the period 1975 to 2005. Our decision to study Australia 
was guided by the fact that we were only able to obtain daily births data for two countries 
– Australia and the United States.
11
                                                 
10  Admittedly, it is possible to come up with reasons such as avoiding computer date difficulties (on 
February 29) or practical jokes (April 1). These effects are likely to be small relative to patient preferences. 
11 Other jurisdictions only provide monthly data that cannot identify the margin of negotiations we study 
here. 
 However, because our empirical strategy relies on the 
interaction between inauspicious dates and weekends, it is necessary that a large share of 
births be moved off inauspicious dates. In Australia, approximately 10 percent of births 
are moved off the inauspicious dates of February 29 and April 1. By contrast, only about 
3 percent of births are moved off these dates in the United States. Consequently, the 
United States ‘inauspicious day’ effects are too small for us to obtain precise estimates of   11 
bargaining parameters (which are derived from looking at the interaction between 
inauspicious dates and weekends).
12
Our identification strategy relies on having daily births data over a large number 
of years. Consequently, we are unable to break our data down by birth procedure 
(cesarean section, induction, etc.), since those more detailed data are only available on a 
daily basis for very recent years. This would not matter if the underlying daily birth count 
was uniform (ie. if the number of births per day was constant but for weekend and 
inauspicious date effects). However, in practice, it is likely that many other factors cause 
the daily birth count to fluctuate from day to day. Such factors might include randomness 
in the timing of conception, or extreme weather shocks that affect birth timing.
 
13
Before introducing our methodology to estimate physician-parent  bargaining 
power, it is useful to document patterns in weekend births in our dataset and establish the 
validity of the inauspicious days we have identified. 
 To the 
extent that these fluctuations are large, we expect that they will attenuate estimates of 
weekend births and inauspicious date effects towards zero. 
In Australia, the birth rate has declined over recent decades, while the population 
has risen. As a result, the number of births has risen only modestly (from 232,682 births 
in 1975 to 258,187 in 2005). We therefore opt to focus on the raw number of births, 
rather than on the birth rate (births/population). This has the added advantage that we do 
not introduce noise into our series through mis-measurement of the total population, 
which is only available on a monthly basis. 
                                                 
12 This could be an indication of a lack of patient power even on days when no conflict arises but it could 
also indicate less power in a patient’s preference. Hence, our focus is on Australia where the power of that 
preference is demonstrated. 
13 On the impact of weather conditions on birth timing, see Driscoll (1995); Yackerson, Piura and Sheiner 
(2008).   12 
Weekend Births 
To begin, we outline  the  patterns of  weekend births. Figure  1  shows  the 
distribution of births across the week. Under a uniform distribution (shown by the solid 
line), 14 percent of babies would be born on each day of the week. The actual data show 
that around 16 percent of births occur each weekday, but only 11 percent occur each 
weekend day. (All differences in birth rates by day are highly statistically significant.) 
Excluding public holidays makes no substantive difference to the analysis. In Table 1, we 
show birth counts by day of week for the full period 1975-2005. 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Births Over the Week 
 
 
Table 1: Birth counts by day of the week (excluding holidays) 
  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Median 



























Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun
Data source is Australian births from 1975 to 2005.
Horizontal line denotes the distribution in the absence of a weekend effect
Holidays are those uniformly observed in Australia: New Year's Day, Australia Day, Anzac Day,
Good Friday, Easter Monday, Christmas Day, and Boxing Day.
Including holidays Excluding holidays  13 
Tue  509  903  742.61  748 
Wed  500  940  744.87  749 
Thu  566  1005  762.27  766 
Fri  508  928  752.27  755 
Sat  414  701  546.72  548 
Sun  375  619  492.30  490 
Weekday  463  1005  738.79  743 
Weekend  375  701  519.53  519 
Total  375  1005  676.71  710 
Note: Data source is Australian births from 1975 to 2005. Holidays are those uniformly 
observed in Australia: New Year's Day, Australia Day, Anzac Day, Good Friday, Easter 
Monday, Christmas Day, and Boxing Day. 
 
The ‘weekend effect’ has grown larger over time. In 1975, 22 percent fewer births 
occurred on weekends than would be expected from a uniform distribution. In 2005, 31 
percent fewer births occurred on weekends than an even distribution would predict. 
Formal tests confirm that the weekend effect has grown significantly larger over time, 
and we discuss these trends in more detail in Gans and Leigh (2008).
14 The magnitude of 
the Australian weekend effect is similar to Chandra et al. (2004), who found that the 




We turn now to the issue of parent preferences in birth timing. To identify this, 
we hypothesize that parents may have preferences over auspicious or inauspicious dates. 
                                                 
14 A spate of studies has analyzed the question of whether weekend births are more dangerous (see for 
example MacFarlane, 1978; 1979; Mangold, 1981; Hendry, 1981; Mathers, 1983; Dowding et al., 1987; 
Gould et al., 2003; Luo et al., 2004; Hong et al., 2007). The majority of these papers find that while the 
infant mortality rate is higher on weekends, this does not necessarily mean that it is more dangerous for a 
given child to be born on a weekend. Controlling for risk factors such as birth weight and maternal age, the 
mortality gap narrows significantly, implying that births which are moved from weekends to weekdays are 
disproportionately healthy.  
15 Indeed, we cannot reject that the share of births moved off weekends has followed precisely the same 
trajectory in both countries over time. In Australia in 1999, 25 percent of births that would have occurred 
on a weekend (if distributed uniformly throughout the week) were moved onto a weekday. Omitting public 
holidays, the share of would-be weekend births moved to a weekday was 24 percent.   14 
In Appendix 1, we show our estimates of birth patterns on 12 possible dates. From these, 
we selected two – February 29 and April Fool’s Day (April 1). Our rationale for selecting 
this pair of dates is threefold. First, we find a highly significant fall in births on these 
dates. Second, it seems highly likely that the fall is driven by parent preferences rather 
than physician preferences. And third, these dates fall on different days of the week, 
allowing us to see how they interact with weekends.  
 It is not difficult to envisage why parents might avoid having their child born on 
February 29 or April 1. Since February 29 only occurs every four years, people born on 
that date must celebrate their birthday on another date in non-leap years. Parents might 
therefore think that their child would be better off not being born on February 29. April 1 
is an ‘inauspicious’ date, since parents might worry (perhaps irrationally) that having ‘the 
fool’s birthday’ has the potential to stigmatize the child at school and in later life. 
Since births are likely to be ‘moved’  only  a small number of days, parental 
aversion to having their child born on February 29 and April 1 is likely to lead to an 
increase in the number of births on the days before and after. In the case of February 29, 
one would expect this to lead to an increase in the number of births on February 28 and 
March 1 in leap years. Likewise, parental aversion for an April 1 birthday is likely to lead 
to an increase in the number of births on March 31 and April 2.  
As discussed in Section 2,  we can think of few  reasons  why  physicians  (or 
maternity hospitals) should be averse to delivering babies on either February 29 or April 
1. Holding constant the day of the week, doctors (like other employees), should be 
indifferent between working on these dates and on the dates immediately preceding and 
following them.   15 
To test the extent to which parents are averse to having their child born on 
inauspicious dates, we estimate the following regressions, using daily births data for 
Australia from 1975-2005, and restricting the sample to the potentially inauspicious day, 
the day before, and the day after. Formally, we run the regression: 
 
~Inauspicious DayOfWeek Year
tt t t t Births I I I βε = + ++   (1) 
where I
~Inauspicious is an indicator variable denoting that the date precedes or follows an 
‘inauspicious’  date. In the case of February 29, the variable I
~Inauspicious  equals 0 on 
February 29, and 1 for the day before and the day afterwards (in leap years only). In the 
case of April 1, the variable I
~Inauspicious is an indicator equaling 0 for April 1, and 1 for the 
day before and the day afterwards. The variables I
DayOfWeek
 and I
Year are indicators for the 
day of the week (taking account of the regular weekly births cycle) and the calendar year 
(capturing other factors that cause the birth rate to change from year to year). 
It is useful for our strategy to define the indicator variable as Not February 29, 
and Not April 1 (rather than February 29 and April 1). To the extent that parents dislike 
inauspicious dates, then these beta coefficients will be positive, as births will be shifted 
off these two inauspicious dates, and onto the adjoining days. (Our results are fairly 
similar if we estimate the regressions using a longer window –  for example if we 
compare births one week before and after the inauspicious date instead of one day before 
and afterwards.) 
For February 29, we use births data from February 28 to March 1 on all leap 
years. For April 1, we use births data from March 31 to April 2 in all years. To avoid 
confounding effects of the Easter holidays, we drop from our analysis the Easter holiday 
period (Good Friday to Easter Monday).    16 
Table 2  shows the results of estimating these regressions. We  present  two 
different specifications, expressing the dependent variable in levels and logs. In each 
case, we find effects that are statistically and substantively significant, as well as being 
quite consistent across specifications. Between 71 and 73 births are moved off these 
inauspicious dates, which is equivalent to 10−11 percent of all babies who would have 
been born on those dates.   
 
     17 
Table 2: Do Parents Avoid Inauspicious Dates? 
  (1)  (2) 
Not Feb 29 
Panel A: Dependent variable is number of births 
73.023***   
  [12.510]   
Not April 1    70.856*** 
    [10.640] 
Observations  24  79 
R-squared  0.97  0.934 
Not Feb 29 
Panel B: Dependent variable is log(number of births) 
0.111***   
  [0.018]   
Not April 1    0.100*** 
    [0.014] 
Observations  24  79 
R-squared  0.976  0.954 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  All 
specifications include day of week fixed effects and year fixed effects. Feb 29 sample is February 28 to 
March 1 on leap years. April 1 sample is March 31 to April 2 in all years (excluding Easter holidays).  
 
Has the share of births that are shifted off February 29 and April 1 grown over 
time? To test this, we interact the Not Feb 29 and Not April 1 terms with a linear year 
term (results not shown). We find that the ‘Not Feb 29’ effect has grown by about 0.2 
percentage points per year, while the ‘Not April 1’ effect has increased by about 0.1 
percentage points per year. 
4.   Estimating Bargaining Power 
We are now in a position to describe and implement our methodology for 
measuring physician-patient relative bargaining power. We first utilize  a simple 
bargaining model to motivate our approach. We then describe our estimation strategy 
before presenting our results.   18 
Bargaining model 
While not all birth timing can be planned, we assume here that negotiations over 
timing take place. This is for exposition of the theoretical model. In the empirical analysis 
below, no such presumption is made and statistical results must be achieved without 
being able to sort the data along these lines. A richer model might incorporate the 
institutional structure of birth timing. However, since our empirical analysis is confined 
to countries where timing is more commonplace, we omit such complications here. 
In this simple model, we suppose that a single doctor and a single patient are 
negotiating over one of two days upon which to have a birth. We assume that the 
marginal benefit that the patient has for day 1 (a weekend) over day 2 (a potentially 
inauspicious day) is  P ∆  while the doctor’s marginal preference is  D −∆ . We assume that 
0 D ∆≥. With probability p,  0 P ∆>; otherwise  0 P ∆≤. Thus, with probability (1- p) 
there is no conflict and day 2 is chosen.
16
If there is a conflict then the patient and doctor bargain over days 1 and 2. We 
utilize the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) assuming that instead of engaging in 
explicit payments, the doctor and patient agree to a randomization rule; that is, they 
negotiate over the choice of p which is the probability that the birth takes place on day 1 
(the patient’s preferred day).  Let 
 
[0,1] α ∈   be a measure of the patient’s bargaining 
                                                 
16 Each of these parameters is specific to individual patient-doctor negotiations but we drop any subscript 
for notational simplicity. Recall from Section 2 that we make four assumptions: (a) doctors prefer weekday 
births to weekend births; (b) patients are indifferent between weekday and weekend births; (c) patients 
dislike inauspicious dates; and (d) doctors are indifferent between regular dates and inauspicious dates. For 
simplicity, we model these preferences by focusing on the choice between a weekend date (which we 
assume the doctor dislikes) and an inauspicious date (which we assume the patient dislikes). In Section 2, 
we discuss the direction of the bias in our empirical analysis if the indifference assumptions (b) and (d) do 
not hold.   19 
power. Then, the doctor and patient solve: 
1 max ( ) ((1 ) ) pP D pp
αα − ∆ −∆ . This yields the 
first order condition: 
 
11 1 1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
*
PD PD pp p p
p p pp p
p
α αα α α αα α αα
α α αα α
α
−− − − − − ∆∆ = − − ∆∆
⇒ − =− ⇒− =−
⇒=
  (2) 
Thus, by measuring p (the probability that a patient ‘wins’ conditional on there being a 
conflict) we have an estimate of the patient’s bargaining power. We can also test whether 




To estimate the strength of relative patient bargaining power, we proceed on the 
assumption that the effects observed in Table 2 reflect only parental preferences, and 
focus on a particular scenario: instances in which our inauspicious dates (February 29 and 
April 1) happen to fall on a Friday or Monday. Such instances provide a natural 
experiment that allows us to compare the bargaining power of doctors and patients when 
there is a conflict. We utilize the incidence of these inauspicious dates falling on a 
weekday as a measure of (1-p), the probability that there is no conflict. 
We now estimate the following regression: 
 
  (3) 
                                                 
17 This model is simplified because we effectively normalize the utility a doctor or patient has for their non-
preferred days to 0. If instead, the patient’s and doctor’s utilities from having the birth on day 2 were uP and 




∆∆ = −   . Notice then that even if α = 0, then it still may be the case 
that births are shifted from inauspicious days to weekends if  0
P ∆<; that is, patients also prefer not to 
have babies on weekends. In practice, we believe that it is unlikely that patients will prefer weekday births, 
since a weekend birth will generally involve shorter travel times to the hospital and lower foregone 
earnings for the father, but will not affect the size of the medical bill.    20 
In this equation,  the variable I
Weekend  is an indicator that equals 1 for Saturdays and 
Sundays, and 0 for Monday through Friday. β represents the extent to which births are 
shifted onto the day before and after an inauspicious date. γ represents the differential 
effect when these dates fall on a weekend. Since the regression includes day of week 
fixed effects, it is unnecessary to include a separate weekend indicator, and since we are 
only looking at a single 3-day period each year, it is unnecessary to also include month 
indicators. Thus,  βγ +  is the number of births shifted off inauspicious dates if that date 
occurs on a weekend.  
Given this, our estimate of p, being the probability that the patient wins if there is 
a conflict, is as follows: 
 
    (4) 
Intuitively, if 100 births are shifted when April 2 is a weekday (β = 100), and only 25 
births are shifted when April 2 is a weekend (γ = -75), then the probability of not shifting 
the date when April 2 is a weekend - assuming that they would have shifted if it was a 
weekday - must be 75%. Thus, the probability that the patient loses is  γβ −  while the 
probability that the patient wins is 1/ γβ + . 
Results 
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 3. In all specifications, the 
coefficients on Not Feb 29 and Not April 1 are larger than in Table 2, indicating that 
parents’ propensity to shift births off inauspicious dates is larger on weekdays. However, 
the interaction terms are large and negative, indicating that parents are much less able to   21 
shift births off ‘inauspicious dates’ when the adjoining date is a weekend. The interaction 
term is negative and statistically significant in all specifications. 
If we regard β (the coefficient on Not Feb 29 and Not April 1) as reflecting parent 
preferences, and γ (the coefficient on Not Feb 29×Weekend and Not April 1×Weekend) as 
reflecting doctor preferences, then we can estimate the relative bargaining strength of 
each side as  γβ − . These estimates are shown in the second-last row of each panel. 
These estimates range from 61% to 91%, suggesting that when the preferences of doctors 
conflict with the preferences of patients, the issue  is resolved in favor of the doctor 
approximately three-quarters of the time.  
In the last row of each panel, we test the hypothesis that doctors have 100 percent 
of the power (formally, a one-tailed test of the hypothesis that  1 γβ −= ).  For  the 
February 29 specifications, the p-values are less than 0.1, indicating that we can reject (at 
the 10% level or better) the hypothesis that doctors have all the power. For April 1 
specifications, we cannot reject this hypothesis  at standard levels of statistical 
significance. These results suggest that doctors do not have all the power to choose the 
timing of births. 
We have also explored the way in which doctor and parent power has changed 
over time, by interacting both the β and γ terms with a linear time trend. In each of our 
four specifications, the results suggest that both weekend effects and inauspicious date 
effects have grown larger in magnitude over time (statistically significant in most 
specifications). The increase in both coefficients is similar, suggesting that the doctor 
power share has not changed substantially over time (results available on request).     22 
Table 3: Parents Versus Doctors 
  (1)  (2) 
Not Feb 29 
Panel A: Dependent variable is number of births 
97.655***   
  [9.566]   
Not Feb 29×Weekend  -72.310***   
  [17.475]   
Not April 1    97.438*** 
    [10.892] 
Not April 1×Weekend    -88.388*** 
    [20.729] 
Observations  24  79 
R-squared  0.990  0.955 
Implied doctor power share (-γ/β)  74%  91% 
F-Test that doctor power share is 
100% (P-value)   0.056  0.300 
Not Feb 29 
Panel B: Dependent variable is log(number of births) 
0.140***   
  [0.018]   
Not Feb 29×Weekend  -0.085**   
  [0.033]   
Not April 1    0.131*** 
    [0.015] 
Not April 1×Weekend    -0.105*** 
    [0.028] 
Observations  24  79 
R-squared  0.987  0.966 
Implied doctor power share (–γ/β)  61%  80% 
F-Test that doctor power share is 
100% (P-value)  0.041  0.131 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All 
specifications include day of week fixed effects and year fixed effects. Feb 29 sample is February 28 to 
March 1 on leap years. April 1 sample is March 31 to April 2 in all years. F-tests are against the null 
hypothesis that -γ/β=1. We use a one-tailed test, on the assumption that doctors’ power share cannot 
exceed 100%. 
 
5.   Conclusion 
At some point in their lives, many people will find themselves in conflict with 
their physician over the manner or timing of their treatment. Yet there exists surprisingly 
little quantitative evidence of the relative power balance in such situations. Our analysis   23 
focuses on a particular conflict – occasions when parents and physicians bargain over the 
timing of births. By exploiting the fact that parents are averse to having their child born 
on February 29 and April 1, we test what happens when parents’ desire to avoid an 
inauspicious birthdate conflicts with doctors’ desire to avoid working on a weekend.  
Our results suggest that the physician-patient negotiations are tipped in favor of 
the physician, but allow us to reject the hypothesis that doctors have all the power in this 
particular context. Indeed, the fact that patients ‘win’ at all is significant as it suggests 
that physicians’ preferences may not necessarily drive all medical decisions. 
One potential reason for the power imbalance is the fact that weekend births are 
costlier for hospitals and disliked by physicians – yet the amount that patients or their 
insurers pay is typically the same on weekdays and weekends. Indeed, while most of the 
babies in our sample were delivered in public hospitals, even parents in the private 
system are generally unable to pay more to secure a weekend birth. A healthcare pricing 
system that enabled hospitals to impose differential costs on parents  for weekday or 
weekend births would have the potential to increase the wellbeing of doctors and patients 
alike. 
A limitation of our analysis here is that we have only considered a single 
population of economic transactions and so have generated one point estimate of average 
bargaining power.
18
                                                 
18 As one referee noted, births are more routine than many medical procedures. Consequently, it is possible 
that patients’ power share might be lower in other settings. 
 While this yields some insight into those negotiations, it would be 
interesting to find contexts where a distribution of bargaining power estimates could be 
generated so as to determine what factors might drive relative bargaining power and 
understand what creates an imbalance in power. Nonetheless, we believe that by utilizing   24 
variation in the degree of conflict as we have done here, researchers will be able to 
estimate bargaining power in richer environments and, in the future, discover those 
factors which drive distributional variables. 
 
     25 
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Appendix 1: Testing Auspicious and Inauspicious Dates 
To test the extent of auspicious and inauspicious dates on births, we use daily birth count 
data to analyze the impact of other dates. We excluded from our analysis dates that are 
designated as nationwide public holidays, since it is quite likely that public holidays will 
have an independent effect on the birth rate.  
 
Our dates are of two types – those that fall on different days of the week, depending on 
the year, and those that always fall on the same day of the week.  
 
Dates that fall on different days of the week: 
•  Chinese New Year 
•  Valentine’s Day (February 14) 
•  Leap Year (February 29) 
•  April Fool’s Day (April 1) 
•  May Day (May 1) 
•  Halloween (October 31) 
•  Remembrance Day (November 11) 
 
Dates that fall on a consistent day of the week: 
•  Mother’s Day (2nd Sunday in May) 
•  Father’s Day (1st Sunday in September) 
•  Melbourne Cup Day (1st Tuesday in November) 
•  Friday 13th 
•  Federal Election dates (the election date is chosen by the governing party, but 
elections are always held on a Saturday) 
 
 
Our identification strategy differs for these two types of dates. For the first set of dates, 
we compare the number of births on the day immediately before and the day immediately 
after, in a regression with day of week fixed effects. For example, our February 14 effect 
is identified from a dummy variable equal to 1 on February 14, and 0 on February 13 and 
15. 
 
For the second set of dates, we compare the number of births on the day with the number 
of births on the same day the previous and following weeks. For example, our Mother’s 
Day effect is identified from a dummy equal to 1 on Mother’s Day, and 0 on the Sunday 
a week before Mother’s Day and the Sunday a week after Mother’s Day. We estimate 
equation (1), shown in the body of the paper. The results for February 29 and April 1 are 
identical to those shown in Table 2, and are re-presented here merely for ease of 
comparison. 
 
In all cases, we estimate the effect using two dependent variables: the raw birth rate and 
the log of the birth rate.  
   29 
The results are shown in Appendix Table 1. In addition to February 29 and April 1, we 
find statistically significant effects for Valentine’s Day, Friday 13, Election Day, and 
Melbourne Cup Day.   
 
However, we take the view that these other dates are unsuitable for our analysis, since 
they may affect doctors’ preferences as well as patients’ preferences. Australian 
obstetricians may prefer to stay home to watch the Melbourne Cup; may prefer to be 
working rather than sitting home alone on Valentine’s Day; and may feel that since they 
must cast their ballot on election day (voting is compulsory in Australia), they might as 
well be at work.  In the case of Friday 13
th, this date is not suited to our empirical 
approach, which relies on exploiting the fact that the inauspicious dates of February 29 
and April 1 fall on different days of the week. 
 
We therefore restrict our analysis to just two inauspicious dates: February 29 and April 1. 
  
 
Appendix Table 1: Auspicious and Inauspicious Dates  
Panel A: Dates that fall on different days of the week (dep var is births) 
  Chinese 
NY  Feb 14  Feb 29  April 1  May 1  Oct 31  Nov 11 
(In)auspicious date dummy  -6.541  19.273***  -73.023***  -70.856***  8.405  -3.577  -3.936 
  [7.608]  [7.210]  [12.510]  [10.640]  [6.477]  [6.658]  [6.367] 
Observations  93  93  24  79  93  93  93 
R-squared  0.941  0.943  0.97  0.934  0.956  0.961  0.957 
 










Elections     
(In)auspicious date dummy  6.968  0.258  -34.468***  -55.192***  15.375*     
  [5.153]  [5.553]  [6.152]  [7.816]  [7.652]     
Observations  93  93  93  156  36     
R-squared  0.735  0.748  0.779  0.568  0.836     
 
Panel C: Dates that fall on different days of the week (dep var is log births) 
Chinese 
NY  Feb 14  Feb 29  April 1  May 1  Oct 31  Nov 11 
(In)auspicious date dummy  -0.013  0.029**  -0.111***  -0.100***  0.012  -0.006  -0.008 
  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.018]  [0.014]  [0.009]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
Observations  93  93  24  79  93  93  93 
R-squared  0.947  0.944  0.976  0.954  0.963  0.969  0.961 
 










Elections     
(In)auspicious date dummy  0.013  0.002  -0.048***  -0.077***  0.028*     
  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.008]  [0.011]  [0.015]     
Observations  93  93  93  156  36     
R-squared  0.732  0.745  0.785  0.554  0.829     
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample for Panels A and C is the (in)auspicious date, plus 
the day before and after. Sample for Panels B and D is the (in)auspicious date, plus the same day of the week one week before and after. All specifications are 
estimated from an OLS regression, including day of week fixed effects and year fixed effects.  